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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD J. YOUNG, t 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. Case No. 
JULIA 1\1. 13ARNEY and UTAH ( 10519 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE l 
COMP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents.: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for the death 
of plaintiff's four-year-old child, who was killed as a 
result of being struck by an automobile driven by the 
defendant Julia 1\1. Barney and after the defendant's 
insurance company entered the case through its attorney 
and took control of the defense, the plaintiff filed an 
amended complaint JOmmg the defendant insurance 
1 
company as a defendant and alleging a cause of action 
against said defendant insmancc company on its polic\· 
of insurance covering the indi,irlual defendant. . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The defendants filed a motion Lo dismiss the amend-
ed complaint and this motioll was granted by the trial 
court as to the defendant insurance company. The 
court also denied plaintiff's motion for production of 
the policy of insurance upon which the amended com-
plaint was based. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of dis· 
missal and order denying plaintiffs motion for produc· 
tion of the policy of insurance and an order remanding 
the case for trial against both defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff initiated this action to recover damages 
for the death of his four-year-old chil<l who was killed 
as a result of being struck by an automobile driven by 
the defendant Julia l\'l. Barney. After the original 
complaint had been filed, it became apparent that the 
defendant driver was insured b~' the Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Company. The insurance company appar· 
ently pursuant to the provisions of a liability insurance 
policy, issued for and on behalf of the defendant Julia 
l\l. Barney, proceeded to defend the ch·iver. 
In vie1y of the foregoing, plaintiff, pursuant to 
leave of court, filed an amended complaint designating 
the Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, a corpo-
ration, as a defendant and prayed judgment against 
defendants and each of them. 
In the amended complaint (R7) the plaintiff 
alleged that defendant .Tulia 1\1. Barney was insolvent; 
that said defendant was insured under a liability insur-
ance policy issued by the defendant insurance company 
to Yon B. Barney, the husband of the defendant Julia 
.i\I. Barney. 
It was further alleged that by the terms of said 
policy the defendant company bound itself to pay all 
damages which the insured under sai<l policy became 
obligated to pay because of bodily injury including 
death at. any time suffered therefrom sustained by any 
person caused by or arising out of the use of the auto-
mobile referred to in the policy. 
It was further alleged that the insurance policy 
expressly provided that the term "insured" included 
any person while using the automobile with the per-
mission of Von B. Barney. 
It was further alleged that the automobile referred 
to in the insurance policy was the same automobile 
which was being operated by the defendant Julia M. 
llarney at the time of the accident, which caused the 
3 
death of plaintiff's d1ild and that it was being used 
with the consent and permission of Yon B. Barney. 
It was further alleged that the insurance policy 
was issued for the protection and benefit of persons 
who might suffer damage through the use and operation 
of the automoble and that by the terms of the policy, 
the defendant was bound to defend any suit against 
persons insured by said policy on account of damages 
arising as aforesaid and the company further bound 
itself to pay any judgment obtained in such suit against 
the person insured thereunder to the extent of the in· 
surance mentioned in the policy (R7). 
The defendants entered their appearance by a 
motion for an order striking and dismissing the amended 
complaint or in the alternative, to dismiss the amended 
complaint as to the def en<lant insurance company and 
to strike from the ameuded complaint all reference to 
said defendant and to said def en<lants' interest therein 
and to any and all reference to any contract of insur· 
ance (Rl2). 
This motion states that it is made upon the grounds 
that the defendant insurance company is not a proper 
party defendant; that there is no privity of contract 
between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the 
basic cause of action alleged by plaintiff against de· 
fendant Julia .M. Barne~' is in tort, that the defendant 
insurance company is not a tort-feasor, that the cause 
of action alleged against the defendant insurance com· 
pany is in contract and that a cause of action in tort 
4 
and in contract against different parties may not be 
maintained and pursued in the same action. 
Plaintiii thereafter filed a motion for production 
of document wherein it mm-ed for an order that the 
defendants be required to produce the policy of insur-
ance coyering Yon B. Barney and in force on the 18th 
of August, 19G± (Rl6). This motion was supported 
by an affidavit of plaintiff's attorney setting forth that 
one of the issues in the case was the construction of 
the terms and provisions of said policy and further 
asserting that the amount of the policy limits would 
be material in determining the interest of the defendant 
insurance company and would be of aid in settling the 
above entitled lawsuit and that the plaintiff could only 
obtain the policy from the defendant insurance com-
pany. The plaintiff filed interrogatories directed to 
the matters concerning the insurance policy (Rl7). 
The two motions came up for hearing before the 
court and the court entered a judgment dismissing the 
amended complaint and cause of action against the 
defendant insurance company and denied plaintiff's 
motion for production of the insurance policy men-
tioned above. The court also denied the request by 
plaintiff for answers to interrogatories. 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DIS-
MISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
5 
Rule 18 (a) of the lJ tah Hules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows to wit: 
"J oinder of Claims. The plaintiff in his com. 
plaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim 
and the defendaut in all answer setting forth a 
counterclaim may joiu either as independent 
or as alternate claims as many claims either legal 
or equitable or both as he ma!· have against an 
opposing party. There may be a like joinder 
of claims when there are multiple parties if the 
requirements of Rules 19. 20 and 22 are satisfied. 
There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or 
third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 
1:3 and 14 respectiye}>· are satisfied." 
Rule 18 (b) provides as follows: 
"J oinder of Heme<lies; Fraudulent Convey· 
ances. 'Vhenever a claim is one heretofore cog· 
nizahle only after another claim has been prose· 
cuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be 
joined in a single action; but the court shall grant 
relief in that action only in accordance with the 
relative substantive rights of the parties. In 
particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for 
money and a claim to have set aside a convey· 
ance fraudulent as to him. without first having 
obtained a judgment establishing the claim for 
money.'' 
Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil Prnccdme 
prm·ides in part as follows: 
"All persons may he joined in one action as 
defendants if there is asserted against them 
jointly, severall>·· or in the alternatiw. any right 
to relief in respect of or arising out of the same 
6 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions 
or occurrences and if any question of law or 
fact common to all of them will arise in the 
action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be 
interested in obtaining or defending a(J'ainst all 
the relief demanded. Judgment may 
0
be given 
for one or more of the plaintiffs according to 
their respective rights to relief, and against one 
or more defendants according to their respective 
liabilities." 
These three rules are identical with the same mun-
bered rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Considering the language of these ruies, there is 
no reason why the defendant insurance company should 
not be made a party to an action in which it has agreed 
to pay a claim only after another claim has been prose-
cuted to a conclusion. Rule 18 (b) expressly states that 
in such event the two claims may be joined in a single 
action. 
It is alleged in the amended complaint that the 
defendant bound itself by its policy of insurance to pay 
all damages which the insured became obligated to pay 
because of bodily injury, including death, caused by or 
arising out of the use of the automobile ref erred to in 
the policy. This Court by the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure has established the rules which should prevail in 
the trial of lawsuits in this state and we submit that the 
allegations of the complaint bring the defendant within 
the meaning of said rule 18 ( b) and it was proper to join 
the defendant insurance company m this action. 
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The trial court refused to require the defendants 
to produce the insurance policy upon which this actio11 
is based, so we cannot determine the exact terms and 
provisions of this policy. 
The courts have generally held that where a policy 
of insurance contains a provision that no action shall be 
brought against the insurer until after the determination 
of the liability of the insured by a final judgment, that 
an action cannot be brought in the first instance against 
the insurer until the determination above indicated has 
been made. See annotation at 159 A.L.R. 763. 
\Ve do not know whether or not this policy contains 
a "no action clause" but even if it does, we still believe 
this case is distinguishable from those holding the defen· 
dant insurance company as not a proper party. Al· 
though we have not seen the policy because of the pre· 
valence of this clause, we request the Court to consider 
that the policy contains such provision in order to avoid 
a second appeal. 
The plaintiff did not bring in the defendant com· 
pany until it had taken over the defense of this case. 
We submit that under such circumstances, the defendant 
insurance company is in no position to assert the "no 
action clause." None of the authorities have considered 
this fact and the present case is distinguishable on this 
ground. 
In DrJJden v. Ocean A ccii!c11i ~ Guarantee Corp., 
Ltd., 138 F.2d 291 ( CC1\7 ~ J ~11.:3), the insured def en· 
8 
dant sought to bring into the case by third party pro-
ce..:dings his insurer in order to make him defend the 
action and pay any judgment which might be rendered 
against the employer. 
The insurer contended that the third party com-
plaint should have been dismissed in view of a clause 
in the policy that no action would lie against the com-
pany to reconr upon any claim or for any loss unless 
brought after the amount of such claim or loss should 
have been fixed and rendered certain bv a fimtl ;rnh-
... .; I._) 
ment against the insurer. This contention \Vil!> rejected, 
the court conceding that the insurer's argument that 
inasmuch as there was no final judgment recovered 
against the insured, no suit laid against the insurer 
would have been sound were it not for the fact that 
the policy in another part imposed the liability on the 
insurer to defend in the name and on behalf of the in-
sured any suit on account of such injury, and the court 
held that in view of such additional provision, the con-
tention could not be sustained. 
The court stated: 
"Insurer also complains that the third party 
complaint should haYe been dismissed because 
under paragraph Se,Ten G of the policy 'No ac-
tion shall lie against the Company to recover 
upon any claim or for any loss * * * unless 
brought after the amount of such claim or loss 
either bv final judgment against this Employer 
after tri.al of the issue * * * . ' Since, they allege, 
there is yet no final judgment, no suit lies against 
9 
them .. Such a con1'itr~1ction would appear logical 
were it not for the fact that the same policy, in 
paragraph Three thereof, imposes the liability 
on the insurer 'To Defen<l, in the name and 0;1 
beha~f of thi~ Employer, any suits or other pro-
ceedmgs which may at any time be instituted 
against him on accouut of such injuries, includ-
ing suits or other proceedings alleging such in-
juries and demanding damages or compensation 
therefor, * * *.' '' 
See also Rowley v. United States, UO F.Supp. 295 
(Utah-1956). 
In 2 Barron and Holtzoff Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Page 81, Section 505, the authors have this 
to say: 
"The literal language of Rule 18 (b) would 
seem to permit joinder of a claim against a tort-
feasor with a claim against the insurer is one 
heretofore cognizable only after another claim 
has been prosecuted to a conclusion. It may be 
argued that the 'no action' clause of the insur· 
ance policy bars suit against the insurer prior to 
judgment against the insured, but this very ar· 
gument has been uniformly rejected by cases 
holding that an insurer may be impleaded pur· 
suant to Rule 14 despite the existence of a 'no 
action' clause. And a significant recent decision 
from the Tenth Circuit holds that where an 
insurance policy proYided that the insurer was 
not liable until the liability of another insurer 
had been determined, hoth insurers may be sued 
in one action. The court answered the argument 
that the action against the insmer protected h~, 
the policy provision was prematme h~· saying: 
IO 
'Rule 18 ( b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure covers this situation * * * .' A number 
o~· ~t.ates. h~ve rul~s or. court-made policies pro-
lub1tmg JOmder of an msurer but it is not clear 
that these affect the outcome and thus must be 
f?llowed ?~ .a feder.al court; similar state poli-
cies prolub1tmg actions to set aside fraudulent 
co11veyances until the claimant has reduced to 
judgment his money claim, and had that judg-
ment returned unsatisfied, are held not con-
trolling in federal court in view of Rule 18 ( b). 
Even though these arguments seem unsatisfac-
tory, the decisions, with the single exception of 
the atypical Tenth Circuit case discussed above, 
have refused to allow joinder of the insurer. 
Undoubtedly the courts have been influenced by 
the almost universal practice of keeping from 
the jury the fact that a defendant carries liability 
. " msurance. 
The 10th Circuit Court case referred to is the case 
of Miller.Y National Insurance Company v. Wichita 
Flour :Mills Company, 257 F.2d 93 (1958). 
\Ve submit that it is time for this Court to say that 
the rules of civil procedure of this state prevail and that 
any provisions of contracts on insurance policies must 
gi,·e way to the superior position of these rules. A con-
tract which attempts to contavene these rules certainly 
is against the public policy therein set forth. 
It has been held that a "no action" provision 1s 
contrary to the public policy of rule 14 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and should therefore not be 
euforced. See Jordan v. Stevens, 7 F.R.D. 40 (Mo. -
11 
1945), and ftfrLouth /'}'ft·c! Corp, 1'. 1llesta 11'lachincr1 
Cmnpan.1;, 17 Fed. Huie.-, Sen. H(a) ~:n, Case 1 
(Pa. - 1952). 
There is no question lli:1 l O\l'l' the years the courts 
have been influenced, tis ;d(J,; 1~·:1'tcd in the above quote, 
by the fad that insurance .-;l1ot1ld i•cH:r be mentioned 
during the Lria1 of the case, kca use it would possibl)· 
h:rn: an a<lYersc effect u 1100 t lie 1 w·y m ci th er rendcrina 
" • lo 
a wrdict for plaintiff or :; '.Tcasit1F it.., amount cJ • 
I-Iowc\·er, there i~, mwt I w r '; idc lo t 111s coin. Through 
the years it has been my cxpcrie11ce that in cases 
defended by insurance c0111pai~i'.'S. the iwmrance com-
pany in defending the case tries i:t C\Tr>- wa>· possible to 
make it appear to the jury that the indi,-idual clefendant 
is the one that will be liable lo pa>- lhc judgment and 
will be the Yictim of a j11dgmcnt lar;,;·c or small. 
Tlie insurance compall~- has the individual defen· 
dant sit at the table along with any family that the 
insured has and creates the ~·cehlg aLtd atmosphere that 
these defendants are the oues who will pay the judg-
ment. 
YV e also belieYe that if tltese <kfendants obtain the 
sympathy of the jury, it refuses lo return a yerdict 
against such persons not on the facts of the case but in 
sympathy. If the insurance company were made to be n 
party to these cases, this type of injustice could not be 
perpetrated and \P~ submit that it is more important to 
preYent this type of situation from arising than to pro-
12 
tect the insurance company from a supposed pre-deter-
mination of the jury against such insurance company. 
\Ve feel sure that trial courts have often had a 
feeling of aversion to playing cat and mouse with the 
jury. The court sits there knowing that the insurance 
company is in fact a party defendant and is participat-
ing in the case to the extent of completely controlling 
the defense, yet it must constantly be on the lookout to 
prevent any mention of this fact to anyone. Many times 
the attorney for the plaintiff is attempting to use sly 
methods of bringing to the attention of the jury the 
fact that insurance may be involved. This has been 
accomplished through questions to the venire previous 
to trial. It sometimes slips out during the course of the 
testimony of one or more of the witnesses. The insurance 
company likewise attempts in every way possible to 
prevent the disclosure of the fact of insurance and of 
the fact of the insurance company's participation in the 
trial. As indicated abon::, it seeks to convey the in-
ference that the individual defendant will have to pay 
the judgment. 
On at least one occasion the writer of this brief has 
he a rel a trial court assert this feeling and a hope for 
the time when everything would be brought out in the 
light of day and the factual situation presented before 
the jury and the contest between a plaintiff and the 
defendant insurance company would be fully revealed 
to the jury. It is our hope that the time for this has 
now arrived in the state of Utah. 
13 
As has been indicated, in some cases, that in this 
day and age, the fact that there is insurance in the ca~e 
does not have the effect on j mies that it once had . 
. Modern-day jurors are much more sophisticated than 
they were several years ago. This is particularly true 
in view of the campaigu that has been carried out in 
adyertising on a national scale that juries sit upon the 
amount of their own insurance premiums. 
This thought has been expressed by Judge Hincks 
in Schevling v. Johnson, 122 F.Supp. 87 (Conn. -
1953) wherein he stated: 
"Indeed, it is my personal opinion, based on 
other cases, that the disclosure in a negligence 
case of the presence of an insurer's interest tends 
to make a jury conscious of the impact of ver· • 
diets on insurance premiums and hence tends 
to emphasize the importance of the jury func· 
tion. Such a result, obviously, is not prejudicial 
to insurers. Nor is it destructive of justice to 
plaintiffs. Justice does not require that lawsuits 
shall he torn from their context in contemporary 
life and be tried in au artifically produced 1 
yacuum. Occasionall.\·· when the presence of an 
insurance company is disclosed through its iii· 
clusion as a named part.\· or through inadver· 
tence and especially ·when its presence is dis· 
closed through improper tactics, there may arise 
need for the judge to make some reference to 
the relationship between wrdicts and the struc· 
ture of the insurance business in order to impress 
the jury with the need for a sense of resp?~si· 
bility in its verdict. But only undue cyrnc1sm 
will support the thesis 1l1at knowledge of tJ1e 
presf'nce of an insurer ·s interest '" ill necessanly 
14 
distort a juror's judgment. I feel sure that such 
knowledge was not prejudicial here." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hrein-
son, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965) indicates a 
step in the right direction in this field. There the subject 
of insurance was mentioned before the jury but the court 
refused to re\·erse the case and in so doing used the 
following language: 
"'Ve are not so callous as to be entirely with-
out appreciation for the position of the defend-
ant in such circumstances, though perhaps not 
quite so keenly affected as defense counsel, who 
quite generally seem to have highly developed 
sensibilities to the mention of the subject of 
insurance, in sames instances entirelv too much 
so, of which we think this is a godd example. 
In our judgment there are some basic fallacies 
involved in assuming that any mention of in-
surance automatically results in such prejudice 
that a motion for a mistrial should invariably 
he granted. 
The first is the assumption that the jurors 
are so unaware of the facts of life that they are 
oblivious to the subject of insurance unless some-
one mentions it. They should be given credit for 
beina people of average intelligence and reason-
ably0 coanizant of the realities of existence. 
Among ~ther things, they drive automobiles and 
are concerned with financial responsibility for 
accidents that may happen. Since 1951 we have 
had our financial responsibility act, the practical 
effect of which is that nearly all cars are covered 
by insurance and the popular belief seems to be 
tirnt it is compulsory. 
15 
, I~1 a pp.lying the law to the everyday affairs 
o.± 11£ e it is the duty of the courts to be as prae-
hcal and realistic as possible and to keep abreast 
of changing times. For that reason, and because 
it has become the almost universal custom to 
carry insurance, they are not nearly so appre· 
hensive that mention of this subject in the pres-
ence of the jury will be prejudicial as they for-
merly were." 
In a footnote the Court noted that Texas without 
statutory authorization has permitted joinder of the 
insurance company and Louisiana and 'Visconsin have 
statutes permitting such joinder. The Court referred to 
authorities supporting the tendency generally toward 
disclosure of the truth in reganl to insurance. 
The defendant insurance company also contended 
that there could be no joinder because there was no 
privity between plaintiff and the defendant insurance 
company, however, in third party beneficiary cases, such 
actions are allowed. 
In Utah it is well established that a person for 
whose benefit a contract is made, may sue on the con· 
tract without having been a party to the contract or to 
the consideration. M ontgorncry v. S pcncer, 1.5 Utah 495, 
50 P. 623, Brown v. JYlarkland, rn Utah 360, 52 P. 597, 
Srnith ti. Bowuwn, 32 Utah 33, 88 P. 687. The reason 
for this rule is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and that 
the decree judgment should finally and completely <le· 
termine the rights of all persons having interest in the 
event of the suit. 
16 
The defendant insurance company also contended 
that claims for tort contract cannot be joined, however, 
under the above quoted rules, a great deal of liberality 
is permitted in the joinder of claims. See 2 Barren & 
Holtzoff ('Vright Edition), Page 75, Section 504. 
A further argument for joinder is that there is a 
common question of law and fact as against each of the 
plaintiffs. That is, the liability and amount thereof so 
far as the individual is concerned and the insurance 
company by being a party, will be bound by this deter-
mination and such finding is one of the necessary con-
ditions upon which liability of the insurance company 
is based. 
We submit that plaintiff here presents a proposi-
tion which has not yet been ruled upon and that is that 
the status that the insurance company should be per-
mitted to assume after it has taken over the defense of 
the case. It is our contention here that this brings them 
into court and in all honesty and fairness, requires that 
their presence be disclosed. 
Also under the foregoing rules, any argument 
against such joinder appears to be unsatisfactory and 
the Court should now rule that truth should out in the 
trial of these negligence cases. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
PRODUCTION OF THE INSURANCE POL-
ICY. 
17 
The action so far as the insurance company is c011. 
cerned was based upon this insurance policy. The Court 
and plaintiff are uninformed as to the contents of thi.1 
document and must guess at its provisions althougi
1 
generally we know what these policies usually contain. 
"Te are unable to even tell whether or not there is, in 
fact, a "no action" clause in this policy. How a documeul 
upon which an action is based can be irrelevant and im· 
material, is a little hard to understand. There is no 
privilege invoked and it should ha \'e been produced. 
Even though the action were not on the policy, 
many authorities holcl that it should he produced in 
order that the plaintiff could know the extent of the 
interest of the insurallce company awl that it might 
also be helpful in the settlement of the case. See the 
1 
annotation in 41 A.L.R. :2d illi8 awl the supplemental 
decisions thereto found in 4 ..t\..L.U. :!d later case senice, 
page 756 . 
.Admittedly there is a split of authority upon this 
proposition. 
'Ve submit that the defendant should be required 
to produce the insurance policy. 
POINT III 
A REFUSAL TO .JOIN THE DEFEN· 
DANT INSURANCE COMP,_\NY YIOLA'fES 
THE CONSTITUTION AL RIGHTS OF THE 
PLAINTIFF VNDER THE UT.AH AND THE 
CNITED ST .ATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
18 
The Court should heed the admonition contained 
111 the Constitution of the State of Utah Article I 
' ' Section 27, wherein it states: 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental prin-
ciples is essential to the security of individual 
rights * * * ." 
An individua 1 plaintiff in these cases is opposed 
by an insurance company with all its resources. It is 
not a contest between the plaintiff and the nominal 
defendant. To hide this fact and not let it be brought 
out into the open, violates the 14th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution in that it abridges the privi-
leges of a citizen of the United States, deprives him of 
property without due process of law and does not afford 
to him the equal protection of the laws. See also Sec-
tions 7, 10 and 11 of Article I of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah relating to due process, trial by jury 
and open courts. 
Freedom of access to the courts and the guarantees 
of equal justice and equal privileges and immunities and 
fair trial by due process of law and right to trial by jury 
of issues of fact are infringed if the courts permit a 
party who is a real party defendant in interest to come 
in in disguise or behind a shield and take over and con· 
trol defense of an action against another party. Con· 
tractual clauses purporting to give such a right cannot 
be upheld. To allow a party to circumvent constitutional 
or statutory provisions by contract in advance violates 
a fundamental principle of Magna Charta, "'Ve will 
rlcny to no man either justice or right." 
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''Among the priYileges and immunities of citj.; 
zenship is included the right of access to the 
~ourts for the purpose of bringing and maintain. 
mg actions. Thi'; includes the right to employ the 
usual remedies for the enforcement of personal 
rights in actions of ewry kind-a right which 
cannot be abrogated or eYen suspended. It has 1 
been said that the right to sue awl def end in the 
courts is one of the highest and most essential 
privileges of citizenship." 16 Am. Jur. 2d 838, 
Sec. 481. 
The right to a fair and imvartial trial and the right: 
to proceed by due process comes within the protection I 
of the .Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti· 
tution. The right is violated if a person who is obligated 
to pay the judgment, and is therefore the real party i 
defendant in interest, is permitted to come in and take 
control of defense of the action and plaintiff is denied 
the right to make such a person a party defendant. 'fhr 
right is violated if an insurance company is permitted' 
to conceal its interest and conduct the defense in the 
name of an insolvent defendant and justify such action• 
by the claim that juries cannot he trusted to be impartial 
with insurance companies. De11ia l of jury trial against, 
a defendant which is the real party <lefeudant in interest 
is a denial of due process and a denial of equal protec· 
tion of the laws and of equal access to the courts. 
The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment ex· 
tends not only to protection against the legislative 
power of the states hut also to the jmlicial and executiw 
powers. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that it is time for this Court to bring 
honesty and fair play into the trial of lawsuits, particu-
larly iu a case where the insurance company has already 
come in and taken over the defense of the case. 
We submit that the court erred in granting the 
motion of the defendants and in denying the motion to 
produce of the plaintiff. 
The case should be returned for trial on the 
amended complaint as it now stands. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILL L. HOYT and 
RA,1VLINGS, Y{ALLACE, :ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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